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1. Introduction 
Essential services for road users as well as for every kind of human activity are strongly 
dependent from road network that is considered a “lifeline” as  one of the essential linear 
infrastructures for human life. When a catastrophic event strikes a wide area, it is necessary 
that the infrastructure system is designed with a high redundancy and/or low risk of failure 
to maintain network function to give access for the rescue service. 
In the case of damage produced by seismic events, the effects of an interruption to the road 
network and the consequent reduction of what remains available profoundly affect the 
overall performance of the system (increasing travelling time, distance and costs). 
The road network must be reliable, that is, it must (Wakabayashi, Idia, 1992) “…. provide a 
safe and not fluctuating service for the traffic and offer the users alternative routes, even 
when some parts of the system are not available due to road accidents, maintenance or 
natural disasters”.  
If network Reliability is able to measure the ability of the system to maintain its performance 
due to the vulnerability to suffer damages of some of its components,  Risk assessment is 
able to consider other aspects in addition to the overall functionality of the network system 
such as the consequences in terms of victims that can derive from the reduction of its 
functionality. 
In the chapter a comprehensive methodology framework for the evaluation of the seismic 
risk and reliability of rural road networks will be presented. These original methodologies 
make it possible to identify beforehand critical parts of the road network as regards to 
possible structural damage and the importance of the connection related to the number of 
inhabitants that could suffer a delay in the emergency services. The analyses were carried 
out considering bridges as the “weak” element of the road infrastructure in case of seismic 
events, but the procedure could also be applied to different types of element (trenches, 
embankments, culverts, etc). 
The methodology has been designed for applications based on Geographic Information 
System (GIS). With reference to different seismic emergency scenarios (road network, 
seismic intensity, O/D routes), case studies are presented to highlight the possibility of a 
preventive estimation of towns and links that present different levels of Risk. 
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2. Risk assessment 
Risk assessment aims to define a measure of the risk. Since risk management is subject to 
large costs and variable benefits, proper risk assessment and management are crucial to 
make successful actions.   
Risk can be defined as: the combination of the likelihood of an occurrence of a hazardous event and 
the severity of the consequences (human, social and economical losses) that can be caused by the 
event. Therefore, if the measurement of uncertainty refers only to the probabilities of the 
event occurrence, the measure of risk requires to carry out both the probability for outcomes 
and the related losses. 
Based on this definition, risk assessment of road network can be carried out as the product 
of three independent factors (Cafiso et al. 2005, Cafiso et al. 2008, Cafiso 2009): 
1) Exposure, given by the number of people (and/or goods) that can be damaged by the 
event. 
2) Hazard, linked to the probability that in a certain place there will be an event of a certain 
intensity with a given return time; 
3) Vulnerability, which defines the propensity of an infrastructural element to undergo 
damage during the event. 
In the following a complete definition of each term and the methodology to measure it will 
be provided. 
 
2.1 Exposure 
Seismic exposure represents the extension, the quantity and quality of the various anthropic 
elements that make up the territorial context (population, buildings, infrastructure, etc.) whose 
conditions and operation could be damaged by a seismic event. The population is the main 
category at risk and the potential number of injured or dead people is considered as a 
measure of exposure. 
In a seismic risk assessment it is fundamental to consider the “direct exposure” of the users 
of the transportation network beyond the “classical” one of the resident population of the 
urban buildings. In fact, specially in urban area, on road infrastructures during much of the 
day a great number of people are exposed to risk as well as those who are inside buildings. 
It should be remembered that in the Loma Prieta earthquake (USA, 17-10-1989, Magnitude 
MSW 7.1) the collapse of the viaducts of the busy Cypress Street, in the City of Oakland, 
caused the highest number of fatalities (42 on a total of 56 deaths) (Figure 1). 
 
   Fig. 1. Loma Prieta, sections of the Cypress viaduct (H.G. Wilshire, U.S. Geological Survey) 
 
The “direct exposure” can be related to the number of users present along the infrastructure 
during the event or to the property value or to the mission of the element in the 
transportation system. The expected vehicle density (vehicles per unit length of road) can be 
used as measure of exposure. 
Table 1 shows threshold direct exposure levels used in CAPTA (NCHRP report 525, 2009) to 
determine if a transportation asset exceeds the threshold and will be included in further 
analysis as a high-consequence asset. The distinct differentiation between potentially 
exposed populations, property, and mission is highlighted within the equation box. 
 
Asset Potentially Exposed 
Population Equation 
Property 
Equation 
Mission Equation 
Road Bridges Separated into primary 
direction and secondary 
direction - for each, if 
vehicles/lane > 2400, assume 
40 vehicles/1000 ft. 
Otherwise assume 7.5 
vehicles/1000 ft 
$20,000/feet (ADT) x (detour length) 75th, 
85th, 95 th percentile thresholds 
relative to typical bridge 
inventory (Example is based on 
the National Bridge Inventory) 
Road Tunnels Separated into primary 
direction and secondary 
direction - for each, il 
vehicles/lane > 2400, assume 
40 vehicles/1000 ft. 
Otherwisw assume 7.5 
vehicles/1000 ft 
$100,000/feet User input for criticality 
Transit/Rail 
Station 
4 x (maximum capacity of rail 
cars) 
Below ground 
= critical 
User input if transfer station is 
critical 
Transit/Rail 
Bridge 
2 x (maximum capacity of rail 
cars) 
$15,600/feet User input percentage of 
ridership that regularly use this 
transit/rail transportation asset 
Transit/Rail 
Tunnel 
2 x (maximum capacity of rail 
cars) 
$40,000/feet User input percentage of 
ridership that regularly use this 
transit/rail transportation asset 
Table 1. Threshold consequence determination (NCHRP REPORT 525, 2009) 
 
In the emergency phases that follow a seismic event, the transportation network has the task 
of making assistance accessible to the stricken area so that aids can be quick and efficient. If 
road infrastructure efficiency has been compromised due to the effects of the quake, to reach 
the stricken areas would be impossible or really slow and difficult. Many strong 
earthquakes have tragically shown the essential role that transportation network has to 
provide timely emergency services after a seismic event. In the Kobe earthquake (Japan, 17-
01-1995, Magnitude MSW 6.92) interruption of the access routes prevented emergency 
services from reaching the devastated areas for many hours (Figure 2). As consequence, 
damage from fires indirectly caused by the quake determined consequences comparable to 
that caused directly by the quake (totally 5.500 fatalities). 
Based on these considerations an original definition of “indirect exposure” on single 
stretches of the road network can be defined in relation to the number of people who would 
experience delays in the arrival of emergency services due to an interruption of that given 
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stretch of the network. The analysis of indirect seismic exposure consists in a study of 
estimations of damage or injury to the population that can result from a road network or of 
a part of it that does not function correctly. It is, obviously, a study of exposure because the 
object is the analysis of damage or injury suffered by people as an indirect consequence of 
the bad efficiency of road networks after the event. 
 
  Fig. 2. Kobe earthquake, interrupted access route and fires caused by the quake 
 
The level of damage caused by this kind of situation is different according to the dimensions 
and characteristics of the city that has been hit by the quake. Each town, in fact, has to be 
considered as a generator of demand for assistance that is proportional to the resident 
population. Therefore, indirect exposure of a stretch of the road network increases with the 
growth of the expected number of resident population stroked by the earthquake in the 
towns linked to it. 
The road system as to be analyzed as a network composed by links (i.e. the road stretches) 
between two nodes representing the intersections.  The assignation of indirect exposure to a 
link of the network follows the following three steps: 
1) to each town (Di) destination of the emergency services, an “direct exposure” value is 
assigned equal to the number of its inhabitants multiplied by the ‘index of seismic risk’ 
ranging between 0 to 0.8 that in Italy is defined proportionally to the percentage of expected 
losses after an earthquake (Ord.P.C.M. n. 2788 del 12/06/1998); 
2) defining the route from the origin (O) to the destination (Di), to each of the links along 
this route, an “indirect exposure” (Ei) is assigned equal to the direct exposure value of the 
town of destination. 
3) the overall indirect exposure of each link of the road network is carried out as sum of the 
Ei values related to all the destinations (Di) using that link in the O/Di routes. 
 
2.2 Hazard 
Seismic hazard defines the probability of occurrence of a seismic event of certain intensity, in a 
given area and in a given period of time. The evaluation of seismic hazard of an area is based on 
the study of historic seismology and on the analysis of the geological seismologic and 
seismogenetic characteristics of the site. 
The historical studies are aimed at the definition of the principal geophysical characteristics 
(epicenter, magnitude, ground acceleration etc.) of seismic events that have struck in the 
past the area under examination, in such a way as to predict the effects of earthquakes 
expected for different return times in terms of horizontal force, acceleration, etc. 
 
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA ) is used as the seismic hazard measurement parameter. In 
Italy, this parameter is provided  by the National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology 
(I.N.G.V.) in terms of PGA with an 81%, 63%, 50%, 39%, 22%, 10%, 5%, 2% probability of 
exceeding this in 50 years, corresponding to a return time period of 30, 50, 72, 100, 200, 475, 
975 and 2475 years.  
 
2.3 Vulnerability 
Seismic vulnerability is defined as the propensity of an element, simple or complex, to suffer 
damage, collapse or modification during a seismic event. Seismic vulnerability is an intrinsic 
characteristic of each construction, that is independent from any kind of external factor. For 
example, the vulnerability of a bridge depends on the construction technologies adopted, on 
the materials employed, on its structural configuration, on its age, on its state of 
maintenance, on the quality of the original project and so on. All these factors are 
independent from the localization of the object and from the probability that a seismic event 
can take place there, which has been already evaluated in the study of seismic hazard. 
To define the vulnerability of a road segment, it should be considered that each stretch 
could be composed by a series of components (bridges, embankments, trenches, tunnels…) 
with different vulnerability characteristics and evaluation models not always comparable. 
In the following tables (tables 2a-2d) a selection of the principal elements that need to be 
considered to evaluate the structural vulnerability for each component, is presented (Cafiso 
et al., 2005). 
 
Element Min. Vulnerability   ← →  Max. Vulnerability 
Design criteria Constructed according to seismic 
criteria 
 Constructed without seismic criteria 
Construction type Continuous  structures Discontinuous structures 
Regularity of 
geometry and 
rigidity 
Regular structures Irregular structures 
Pier type Single Multiple  
Abutment height Low High 
Soil-foundation 
system 
good Bad and with liquefaction problems 
Condition of the 
construction 
Good state of conservation Bad state of conservation 
Alignment Low angles of deviation High angles of deviation 
Type of bearing 
support 
If longitudinal and transversal 
movement is allowed and there are 
systems to prevent girder fall 
Simple support 
Expansion joints None Present with seismic criteria Present with a short 
base 
Building material steel Reinforced concrete masonry 
Table 2a. Factors for the evaluation of seismic vulnerability of bridges and viaducts 
 
If more than one vulnerable component is present on the same network link, to characterise 
with only one indicator of vulnerability a stretch of road between to nodes, many criteria of 
aggregation could be used, among which one of the simplest and of immediate application 
www.intechopen.com
Assessment of seismic risk and reliability of road network 299
 
stretch of the network. The analysis of indirect seismic exposure consists in a study of 
estimations of damage or injury to the population that can result from a road network or of 
a part of it that does not function correctly. It is, obviously, a study of exposure because the 
object is the analysis of damage or injury suffered by people as an indirect consequence of 
the bad efficiency of road networks after the event. 
 
  Fig. 2. Kobe earthquake, interrupted access route and fires caused by the quake 
 
The level of damage caused by this kind of situation is different according to the dimensions 
and characteristics of the city that has been hit by the quake. Each town, in fact, has to be 
considered as a generator of demand for assistance that is proportional to the resident 
population. Therefore, indirect exposure of a stretch of the road network increases with the 
growth of the expected number of resident population stroked by the earthquake in the 
towns linked to it. 
The road system as to be analyzed as a network composed by links (i.e. the road stretches) 
between two nodes representing the intersections.  The assignation of indirect exposure to a 
link of the network follows the following three steps: 
1) to each town (Di) destination of the emergency services, an “direct exposure” value is 
assigned equal to the number of its inhabitants multiplied by the ‘index of seismic risk’ 
ranging between 0 to 0.8 that in Italy is defined proportionally to the percentage of expected 
losses after an earthquake (Ord.P.C.M. n. 2788 del 12/06/1998); 
2) defining the route from the origin (O) to the destination (Di), to each of the links along 
this route, an “indirect exposure” (Ei) is assigned equal to the direct exposure value of the 
town of destination. 
3) the overall indirect exposure of each link of the road network is carried out as sum of the 
Ei values related to all the destinations (Di) using that link in the O/Di routes. 
 
2.2 Hazard 
Seismic hazard defines the probability of occurrence of a seismic event of certain intensity, in a 
given area and in a given period of time. The evaluation of seismic hazard of an area is based on 
the study of historic seismology and on the analysis of the geological seismologic and 
seismogenetic characteristics of the site. 
The historical studies are aimed at the definition of the principal geophysical characteristics 
(epicenter, magnitude, ground acceleration etc.) of seismic events that have struck in the 
past the area under examination, in such a way as to predict the effects of earthquakes 
expected for different return times in terms of horizontal force, acceleration, etc. 
 
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA ) is used as the seismic hazard measurement parameter. In 
Italy, this parameter is provided  by the National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology 
(I.N.G.V.) in terms of PGA with an 81%, 63%, 50%, 39%, 22%, 10%, 5%, 2% probability of 
exceeding this in 50 years, corresponding to a return time period of 30, 50, 72, 100, 200, 475, 
975 and 2475 years.  
 
2.3 Vulnerability 
Seismic vulnerability is defined as the propensity of an element, simple or complex, to suffer 
damage, collapse or modification during a seismic event. Seismic vulnerability is an intrinsic 
characteristic of each construction, that is independent from any kind of external factor. For 
example, the vulnerability of a bridge depends on the construction technologies adopted, on 
the materials employed, on its structural configuration, on its age, on its state of 
maintenance, on the quality of the original project and so on. All these factors are 
independent from the localization of the object and from the probability that a seismic event 
can take place there, which has been already evaluated in the study of seismic hazard. 
To define the vulnerability of a road segment, it should be considered that each stretch 
could be composed by a series of components (bridges, embankments, trenches, tunnels…) 
with different vulnerability characteristics and evaluation models not always comparable. 
In the following tables (tables 2a-2d) a selection of the principal elements that need to be 
considered to evaluate the structural vulnerability for each component, is presented (Cafiso 
et al., 2005). 
 
Element Min. Vulnerability   ← →  Max. Vulnerability 
Design criteria Constructed according to seismic 
criteria 
 Constructed without seismic criteria 
Construction type Continuous  structures Discontinuous structures 
Regularity of 
geometry and 
rigidity 
Regular structures Irregular structures 
Pier type Single Multiple  
Abutment height Low High 
Soil-foundation 
system 
good Bad and with liquefaction problems 
Condition of the 
construction 
Good state of conservation Bad state of conservation 
Alignment Low angles of deviation High angles of deviation 
Type of bearing 
support 
If longitudinal and transversal 
movement is allowed and there are 
systems to prevent girder fall 
Simple support 
Expansion joints None Present with seismic criteria Present with a short 
base 
Building material steel Reinforced concrete masonry 
Table 2a. Factors for the evaluation of seismic vulnerability of bridges and viaducts 
 
If more than one vulnerable component is present on the same network link, to characterise 
with only one indicator of vulnerability a stretch of road between to nodes, many criteria of 
aggregation could be used, among which one of the simplest and of immediate application 
www.intechopen.com
Modelling, Simulation and Identiication300
 
consists in giving to the whole stretch the maximum value from among the indicators of 
structural vulnerability of the components that make it up. 
 
Element Min. Vulnerability  ← →  Max. Vulnerability 
Design criteria Constructed according to seismic 
criteria 
 Constructed without seismic criteria 
Height Low High 
Geometrical 
condition of the site 
Low inclination 
of ground  
 
High inclination of 
ground with 
seismic wall 
High inclination 
of ground with 
no seismic wall  
High inclination 
of ground 
without wall 
Embankment 
geometry 
Slope inclination < 2/3 Slope inclination > 2/3 
Soil support 
characteristics 
Good Bad 
Condition of the 
structure 
Good state of conservation Bad state of conservation 
Slope protection Presence of slope protection No slope protection 
Table 2.b. – Factors for the evaluation index of seismic vulnerability of embankments 
 
Element Min. Vulnerability  ← →  Max. Vulnerability 
Design criteria 
 
Constructed according to antiseismic 
criteria 
 Constructed without antiseismic 
criteria 
Geological and 
geometric condition 
of slope 
Dynamic safety coefficient Fs  1.3 Dynamic safety coefficient Fs < 1.3 
Length - Height Trenches low and short Trenches long and high 
Rock fall 
 
Impossible Possibility of rock fall with slope 
protection 
Possibility of rock fall 
without slope 
protection 
Retaining structures built according to antiseismic laws Not built according to antiseismic laws 
Table 2.c. – Factors for the evaluation index of seismic vulnerability of trenches 
 
Element Min. Vulnerability  ← →  Max. Vulnerability 
Design criteria 
 
Constructed according to 
antiseismic criteria 
 Constructed without antiseismic 
criteria 
Geostructural 
condition of the 
mass 
Good: no earth pressure - absence 
of discontinuity 
Bad: earth pressure - presence of 
landslides and discontinuities 
Deformation joint Presence of deformation joints Absence of deformation joints 
Location Deep tunnel  Superficial tunnel 
Section area Small Large 
Section type Closed section Open section 
Condition of the 
structure 
Good state of conservation Bad state of conservation 
Table 2.d. – Factors for the evaluation index of seismic vulnerability of tunnels 
 
 
Therefore, basing on experience acquired after a strong Earthquake, a first level macro 
analysis of large road networks can be conducted considering the vulnerability of only 
bridges as the weak road structural element when an earthquake strikes (Figure 3). 
 
 Fig. 3. Example of bridge collapse after an earthquake 
 
To evaluate the seismic vulnerability of the bridges forming part of a road network, a model 
(Buckle, Kim, 1995) was selected from the literature because it is particularly effective for the 
proposed approach: 
- it minimizes the arbitrariness of subjective judgement;  
- all the parameters indicated by the procedure can be easily identified in the bridges of the 
area under investigation;  
- the way of determining damage as a product of hazard and vulnerability is suitable for the 
risk evaluation method adopted;  
- the model provides a numerical damage index.  
In the model (Buckle, Kim, 1995), the level of vulnerability (V) is obtained using a linear 
regression of the damage indicators recorded during seismic events and related to 
evaluation parameters present in the model: 
 
V = Σi βi × Xi (1) 
 
where: Xi (i=1,…,12) is the value assumed by the model parameters (Intensity of Peak 
Ground Acceleration, Design Specification, Type of Superstructure, Shape of 
Superstructure, Internal Hinge, Type of Pier, Type of  Foundation, Material of Substructure, 
Irregularity in Geometry or in Stiffness, Site Condition, Effect of Liquefaction, Seat Lenght); 
βi is the weighting factors for each attribute. 
 
2.4 Damage 
Once the vulnerability (V) and the Hazard (PGA) are defined, it is possible to obtain the 
damage index for each bridge by means of the following relation: 
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D = XPGA × V (2) 
 
where XPGA is the hazard index assuming the values shown in Table 3. 
 
PGA XPGA 
PGA < 0,1 g 1 
0,1 g  < PGA < 0,2 g 2 
0,2 g < PGA < 0,3 g 3 
PGA > 0,3 g 4 
Table 3. hazard index XPGA 
 
From equations (1) and (2), the damage D can assume values of between 0 and 9 (0=no 
damage, 9=maximum damage). Increasing the bridge damage a reduction in the residual 
traffic capacity (transitability) of the link can be expected. Usually, for low level of damage 
(only pavement cracking) without structural failure a low speed traffic can be permitted, for 
medium level of damage (large cracking, join fault) without structural collapse a limited and 
controlled traffic (only emergencies services) can be permitted, for high damage (deck 
unseating) till to the collapse of the structure, traffic is not permitted. Therefore, the loss of 
transitability Index, ranging from 0 to 10 (0=no traffic limitation, 10=traffic not permitted), is 
associated to the level of damage with the relation shown in figure 4.  
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2.5 Risk 
The risk factor is associated to the access of emergency services to the towns after an 
earthquake. Therefore, the road network risk assessment can be defined by associating the 
Damage (Hazard x Vulnerability) and Exposure factors to the links of the road network. 
 
The procedure comprises the following 5 steps (Cafiso et al, 2008) which refer to different 
phases of the process and different items of the network system: 
Step 1 –Hazard and Vulnerability (item: bridge) 
To each bridge in the road network values of vulnerability (V) and XPGA are associated 
depending to the structural features of the bridge (equation 1) and to the seismic scenario 
expected in the location of the element (Table 3). 
For each bridge an index of Damage is calculated as product of Hazard and Vulnerability 
(equation 2). Moreover, the loss of Transitability index can be associated to damage (figure 4). 
Step 2 - damage and Loss of Transitability (item: link) 
When dealing with road links where there are no bridges or overpasses then both Damage 
and Loss of Transitability were taken as being equal to 0. For those stretches where there is 
one bridge or overpass the Damage and Loss of Transitability indexes were assigned on the 
basis of values carried out in step 1. Finally, if there are more than one bridge and/or 
overpass then the Damage and Loss of Transitability indexes of the stretch were considered 
as being equal to the maximum of the values attributed to the different bridges or 
overpasses. 
Step 3 - O/D routes (item: town) 
After having defined the origin (O) and the destination (D) in the earthquake scenario, the 
routes connecting each O/D connection can be defined using different criteria (e.g. length, 
travel time, encountered bridge damage or Loss of Transitability). 
Step 4 - Indirect exposure factor (item: link) 
An indirect exposure value is assigned to each link of the road network constituting part of 
the O/D route equal to the number of inhabitants in the town of destination multiplied by 
its seismic risk index (exposure of the town). 
Once all the O/Di routes has been identified for all the “i” destinations, an indirect exposure 
value can be associated to each link of the network equal to the sum of the values attributed 
to this link in each of the O/Di. 
Therefore, some stretches of the network have a nil exposure, because they have never been 
used for O/D routes. Others have an exposure value based on a single destination, while 
those which have been used a number of times in order to reach different destinations have 
an exposure value equal to the sum of the exposures of the towns for which the stretch is 
used for that type of route. 
Step 5 - Risk evaluation (item: link) 
When for each link of the road network the damage value (Step 2) and the indirect exposure 
(step 4) are carried out, it is possible to obtain the risk value of the link as product of damage 
and indirect exposure values. 
 
Risk = Indirect exposure × Damage 
 
3. Case Study 
Referring to a high seismic-risk area of eastern Sicily (Italy) as case study, it was possible to 
verify the effectiveness of the proposed procedure. The methodology has been designed for 
applications based on Geographic Information System (GIS). In particular, implementing 
the method using the GIS made it possible to draw up maps which identify the most critical 
stretches for different earthquake scenarios and emergency service origins. 
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3.1 Area of investigation 
The province of Catania has an area of about 3,552 Km2 in which there are 58 towns/cities 
with an overall population of 1,054,778 inhabitants. 
The GIS contains all the data necessary for an analysis of risk and emergency management, 
organized in shape-files and relational data bases. All the bridges and overpasses present on 
the road network were positioned within the GIS using 1:10,000 scale maps of the province. 
321 bridges and overpasses situated on stretches of the road network within the study zone 
were localized. For each bridge “j” a visual inspection was carried out and data were 
obtained from the Department of Transport and local road Agencies to evaluate the 
vulnerability parameters Xji of model (1). As result each bridge localized in the GIS has as 
attribute a vulnerability index Vj 
 
Vj = Σi βi × Xji (3) 
 
 Fig. 5. Area of investigation, road network and bridges localization 
 
Based on the history of seismic events in the investigated area, three levels of hazard (PGA 
values) were chosen, characterized by different return times: 
1) events having a return time period of 50 years for the most frequent shakes (PGA with 50 
% probability of exceeding the value in the next 50 years) (Figure 6.a); 
2) events having a return time period of 100 years for not particularly severe and localized 
earthquakes (PGA with 39 % probability of exceeding the value in the next 50 years) (Figure 
6.b); 
 
3) events having a return time period of 475 years which corresponds to the strongest 
seismic events taken into consideration by building regulations (PGA with 10 % probability 
of exceeding the value in the next 50 years) (Figure 6.c); 
 
 (a) 
    (b) (c) 
Fig. 6. Maps of PGA with return times of 50 years (a), 100 years (b) and 475 years (c) (Istituto 
Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia (I.N.G.V.), Italy) 
 
3.2 Risk assessment 
The methodology has been designed for applications based on Geographic Information 
System (GIS). The case study presentation is subdivided in four phases that represents the 
different activities carried out in the process to asses the seismic risk  of the road network. 
 
Phase 1 - damage and Loss of Transitability index 
Using specific GIS tools, it was possible to attribute a specific PGA value to each bridge 
previously localized in the area (Figure 7) using an “overlay analysis” procedure on the area 
values drown from the seismic maps of I.N.G.V.. 
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 Fig. 7:  50, 100 and 475-year PGA maps of bridges on the road network 
 
Once the vulnerability (Vj) was defined and the Hazard (XjPGA) noted, the adopted model 
made it possible to obtain the expected damage index for each bridge by means of the 
following relation: 
 
Dj = XjPGA × Vj 
 
From the relation showed in figure 4, also a value of Loss of Transitability can be associated 
as attribute to each bridge. 
When dealing with stretches where there are no bridges or overpasses then both Damage 
and Loss of Transitability were taken as being equal to 0 for any earthquake scenario (50, 
100 and 475 years). For those stretches where there is one bridge or overpass the Damage 
and Loss of Transitability indexes were assigned on the basis of values taken from the 
previously-illustrated model for the various earthquake scenarios at 50, 100 and 475 years 
(figure 5). Finally, if there is more than one bridge and/or overpass then the Damage and 
Loss of Transitability indexes of the stretch were considered as being equal to the maximum 
of the values attributed to the different bridges or overpasses. 
Phase 2 - O/D routes  
Two different emergency service origins were chosen: 
1) Origin North (ON): the motorway from the town of Messina that represent the connection 
of Sicilia Island to the continental part of Italy; 
2) Origin West (OW): the interchange in the Catania urban Freeway, relating to emergency 
services coming from eastern Sicily and the southern part of the province of Catania.  
As regards destinations, 5 towns in the study area were considered: 
Acireale (D1: 33,010 inhabitants),  Santa Venerina (D2: 4,056 inhabitants), Aciplatani (D3: 
3,269 inhabitants), Linera (D5: 2,781 inhabitants), Guardia Mangano (D6: 2,457 inhabitants). 
The shape-file relating to the roads present in the province of Catania and the segmentation 
of the network as connected links makes it possible to use a GIS tool able to define the best 
route from the Origin (ON or OW) to the Destination (Di). The best rout is the one among all 
 
the alternatives which minimize the cost of transport obtained as sum of the cost attributes 
of each link composing the route (figure 8). 
After having defined the origin (O) and the destination (D) in the earthquake scenario, 4 
different routes can be identified for each O/D connection using as cost function Length, 
Time, Damage and Transitability attributes at 50, 100 and 475 years previously assigned to 
the links of the road network. 
 
   Fig. 8. Origin Nord and West: minimum length routes (red line), minimum time (green), 
minimum damage (blue) and minimum loss of transitability (black) 
 
Phase 3 - Indirect exposure factor 
An indirect exposure value is assigned to each link of the road network constituting part of 
the O/D route equal to the number of inhabitants in the town of destination (Di) multiplied 
by its seismic risk index (exposure of the town). 
Once all the O/Di routes of the same type has been identified for all the “i” destinations, an 
overall indirect exposure value can be associated to each link of the network equal to the 
sum of the values attributed to the link in each of the O/Di. 
Therefore, some stretches of the network have a nil exposure, because they have never been 
used for O/D routes. Others have an exposure value based on a single destination, while 
those which have been used a number of times in order to reach different destinations have 
an exposure value equal to the sum of the exposures of the towns for which the stretch is 
used for that type of route (figure 9). 
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 Fig. 9.  classes of indirect exposure 
 
Phase 4 - Risk evaluation of the links 
When the damage value (Phase 2) and the indirect exposure of each single link of the 
network (Phase 3) are carried out it is possible to obtain the risk value relating to that 
particular route, by multiplying the damage value by the exposure value. 
 
Risk = Indirect exposure × Damage 
 
In GIS environment, risk maps can be drawn up for each of the origins. The thematic maps 
graphically highlight those road network stretches having the highest risk index (Figures 10, 11) 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 10. Thematic risk map for the minimum length route (Cafiso et al, 2008) 
 
 Fig. 11. Thematic risk map for the route with minimum damage (Cafiso et al, 2008) 
 
4. Lifeline Reliability 
In general terms, Reliability can be defined as the “the probability of a device performing its 
purpose adequately for the period of time intended under the operating conditions encountered” [1]. 
A road network, in particular, will be reliable if “…. provides a safe and not fluctuating 
service for the traffic and offers the users alternative routes, even when some parts of the 
system are not available due to road accidents, maintenance or natural disasters” 
The transport network is affected by two different phenomena that can modify its reliability: 
1) Variation in what is offered for transportation; 
2) Variation in the demand on the transport services. 
In the case of damage produced by seismic events the effects of the interruption of the local 
network and the consequence reduction in what remains available affect the overall 
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performance of the system (increase in travel time, distance and costs). In some cases it 
could be of primary importance that the journey finishes in a determined period of time, 
while in other cases it is more important to evaluate if there are interruptions along the 
route that could obstruct to reach the destination [Selçuk, Yücemen, 1999 - Du, Nicholson, 
1997). 
With this aim the following two different terms of reliability can be defined: 
 Terminal Reliability is “the probability that nodes are connected, i.e. it is possible to 
reach the destination” and this is surely the parameter that is easier to evaluate. 
 Encountered Reliability is “the probability of not encountering a link degradation on 
the path with least (expected) cost”.  
Another concept that is complimentary to the previous, is the reliability of the time and cost 
of the journey, commonly defined as “the probability that a trip can be successfully finished 
within a specified time interval”. 
 
4.1. Encountered Reliability 
For the attribution of an Encountered Reliability the travel-length and  -time of the route 
from an origin (Oj) to a destination (Di) which minimize the overall cumulative expected 
damage after an earthquake (post event route) are compared with the original best route 
with the minimum travel time and length (travel cost) without considering any interruption 
(pre event route). 
For each destination, the index of Encountered Reliability can be obtained by the formula 
[10]: 
  
2min,
, 2min,
( )( )  ( )
j Di
j R Di
j E Di
l OE O l O
 (4) 
where: 
Di = Destination town for emergency services 
l(Oj)min,Di = minimum cost (in terms of time or length) from the origin (Oj) to the 
destination Di (pre event route); 
l(Oj)Emin,Di = travel cost (in terms of time or length) related to the route, from the origin 
(Oj) to the destination Di, along which there are the minimum level of expected bridge 
damages (post event route). 
Using this approach E(Oj)R,Di is always less or equal to 1 and, therefore, the most reliable 
routes are characterized by higher values of E(Oj)R,Di in as much as the alternative for the 
emergency services is not much longer than the direct route. 
Once the values of E(Oj)R,Di have been defined from equation (4) for each origin for the 
emergency services (Nord, West, etc.), it is possible to establish a general value for the 
Encountered Reliability for each town ERTOT(Di), as an average weighted on the itineraries 
with respect to the different origins: 
  


j
j
j
iRDjj
DiRTOT p
OEp
E
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 )(  (5) 
where: 
 
Oj= J=1, .. n and represents the n origins of the emergency services that can serve the 
destination Di; 
pj= weight factor related to the importance of Origin Oj; 
From the relationship between the direct exposure values for each town (Di) and the relative 
total value of ERTOT(Di) it is possible to obtain an Encountered Risk factor RE(Di) related to 
each town (Destination) of the area under investigation (Figure 12): 
  
  
DiRTOT,E
i)exposure(DDirect  )( iDRE  (6) 
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 Fig. 4. Risk factors of Encountered Reliability related to different destinations (towns in East 
of Sicily, IT) (Cafiso et al., 2004) 
 
4.2. Terminal Reliability 
For the definition of Terminal Reliability the routes that lead, from the Origin (Oj), to the 
destination (Di), bypassing the bridges with defined level of damage are considered. The 
iterative procedure stops either when there are no more bridges to by pass along the 
alternative route and the destination is reached or it is no longer possible to reach the 
destination. 
The index of Terminal Reliability, for the entire road network can be obtained by the 
formula: 
 2
min,
2
min,
, )(
)( )(
DiTj
Dij
DiRj Ol
OlOT    (7) 
where: 
Di = Destination town for emergency services 
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destination Di; 
pj= weight factor related to the importance of Origin Oj; 
From the relationship between the direct exposure values for each town (Di) and the relative 
total value of ERTOT(Di) it is possible to obtain an Encountered Risk factor RE(Di) related to 
each town (Destination) of the area under investigation (Figure 12): 
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4.2. Terminal Reliability 
For the definition of Terminal Reliability the routes that lead, from the Origin (Oj), to the 
destination (Di), bypassing the bridges with defined level of damage are considered. The 
iterative procedure stops either when there are no more bridges to by pass along the 
alternative route and the destination is reached or it is no longer possible to reach the 
destination. 
The index of Terminal Reliability, for the entire road network can be obtained by the 
formula: 
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l(Oj)min,Di = minimum cost (in terms of time or length) from the origin (Oj) to the 
destination Di (pre event route); 
l (Oj)Tmin,Di = travel cost (in terms of time or length) related to the route, from the origin 
(Oj) to the destination Di, (post event route) along which there are only bridges with 
damage lower than a defined value. 
Using this approach T(Oj)R,Di is always less or equal to 1 and, therefore, the most reliable 
routes are characterized by higher values of T(Oj)R,Di. 
Once the values of T(Oj)R,Di have been defined from equation (7) for each origin for the 
emergency services (Nord, West, etc.), it is possible to establish a general value for the 
Terminal Reliability for each town TRTOT(Di), as an average weighted on the itineraries with 
respect to the different origins: 
  


j
j
j
iRDjj
DiRTOT p
OTp
T
)(
 )(  (8) 
where: 
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From the relationship between the direct exposure values for each town (D) and the relative 
total value of TRTOT,Di it is possible to obtain the risk factor R (Figure 13): 
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If the previous definition of Risk (paragraph 3) is associated to the network links, 
Encountered and Terminal Reliability Risk factors are related to the town of destination 
given an evaluation of the probability to encounter an obstruction in the route to reach the 
destination. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The maintenance of an efficient road network after an earthquake is fundamental if 
emergency services from outside the area have to reach the struck towns as easily and 
quickly as possible. Therefore, risk and reliability assessment of road network are 
indispensable to evaluated beforehand, so as to program seismic retrofitting works to the 
links which are strategic to the efficient functioning of the road network.  
An original methodology to conduct risk assessment is presented, which makes it possible 
to identify the links of the road network with a higher level of risk both as regards to 
possible structural damage and the importance of the connection related to the number of 
inhabitants that can be reached by the emergency services. The analyses were carried out 
considering bridges as the “weak” element of the road infrastructure in cases of seismic 
events, but the procedure could also be applied to different types of element (trenches, 
embankments, culverts, etc). 
Using a high seismic-risk area of eastern Sicily as a case study, it was possible to verify the 
effectiveness of the proposed procedure. In particular, implementing the method using a 
GIS software made it possible to draw up maps which identify the most critical stretches for 
different earthquake scenarios (return times of 50, 100, 475 years) and emergency service 
origins.  
Also the concepts of Encountered and Terminal Reliability can be used to identify the routes 
that lead to specific destination from the origins of emergency services, crossing the 
minimum level of expected damage of bridges, both in terms of length and time to cover the 
given distance. These values can be referred to the towns of destination for the emergency 
services allowing the definition of a risk index relative to the accessibility of the town in case 
of earthquakes. 
If the previous definition of Risk (paragraph 3) is associated to the network links, 
Encountered and Terminal Reliability Risk factors are related to the town of destination 
given an evaluation of the probability to encounter an obstruction in the route to reach the 
destination. 
This information are useful in order to identify those parts of the road network where more 
resources should be employed both to program retrofitting work on structures and for a 
more in-depth analysis of the system. 
 
6. References 
Buckle I.G., Kim S.H., A vulnerability assesment for highway bridge. ASCE. Lifeline 
Earthquake Engineering, 1995. 
Cafiso S., Condorelli A., Cutrona G., Mussumeci G. A Seismic Network Reliability 
Evaluation on GIS Environment - A Case Study on Catania Province. Risk Analysis 
IV, 2004, pagg. 131-140 - WIT Press, – ISBN 1-85312-736-1. 
www.intechopen.com
Assessment of seismic risk and reliability of road network 313
 
l(Oj)min,Di = minimum cost (in terms of time or length) from the origin (Oj) to the 
destination Di (pre event route); 
l (Oj)Tmin,Di = travel cost (in terms of time or length) related to the route, from the origin 
(Oj) to the destination Di, (post event route) along which there are only bridges with 
damage lower than a defined value. 
Using this approach T(Oj)R,Di is always less or equal to 1 and, therefore, the most reliable 
routes are characterized by higher values of T(Oj)R,Di. 
Once the values of T(Oj)R,Di have been defined from equation (7) for each origin for the 
emergency services (Nord, West, etc.), it is possible to establish a general value for the 
Terminal Reliability for each town TRTOT(Di), as an average weighted on the itineraries with 
respect to the different origins: 
  


j
j
j
iRDjj
DiRTOT p
OTp
T
)(
 )(  (8) 
where: 
Oj= J=1, .. n and represents the n origins of the emergency services that can serve the 
destination Di; 
pj= weight factor related to the importance of Origin Oj; 
 
From the relationship between the direct exposure values for each town (D) and the relative 
total value of TRTOT,Di it is possible to obtain the risk factor R (Figure 13): 
 
  
DiRTOT,
i
T
)exposure(DDirect  )( iDRT  (9) 
 
 
0
200
400
600
800
1.000
1.200
1.400
1.600
1.800
Ca tania Militello Scordia Giarre Raddusa Viz zini Pa ternò Acireale Caltagirone Misterbianco
R(T) - ti me
R(T) - dis tance
 Fig. 13. Risk factors connected to Terminal Reliability (Cafiso et al., 2004) 
 
If the previous definition of Risk (paragraph 3) is associated to the network links, 
Encountered and Terminal Reliability Risk factors are related to the town of destination 
given an evaluation of the probability to encounter an obstruction in the route to reach the 
destination. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The maintenance of an efficient road network after an earthquake is fundamental if 
emergency services from outside the area have to reach the struck towns as easily and 
quickly as possible. Therefore, risk and reliability assessment of road network are 
indispensable to evaluated beforehand, so as to program seismic retrofitting works to the 
links which are strategic to the efficient functioning of the road network.  
An original methodology to conduct risk assessment is presented, which makes it possible 
to identify the links of the road network with a higher level of risk both as regards to 
possible structural damage and the importance of the connection related to the number of 
inhabitants that can be reached by the emergency services. The analyses were carried out 
considering bridges as the “weak” element of the road infrastructure in cases of seismic 
events, but the procedure could also be applied to different types of element (trenches, 
embankments, culverts, etc). 
Using a high seismic-risk area of eastern Sicily as a case study, it was possible to verify the 
effectiveness of the proposed procedure. In particular, implementing the method using a 
GIS software made it possible to draw up maps which identify the most critical stretches for 
different earthquake scenarios (return times of 50, 100, 475 years) and emergency service 
origins.  
Also the concepts of Encountered and Terminal Reliability can be used to identify the routes 
that lead to specific destination from the origins of emergency services, crossing the 
minimum level of expected damage of bridges, both in terms of length and time to cover the 
given distance. These values can be referred to the towns of destination for the emergency 
services allowing the definition of a risk index relative to the accessibility of the town in case 
of earthquakes. 
If the previous definition of Risk (paragraph 3) is associated to the network links, 
Encountered and Terminal Reliability Risk factors are related to the town of destination 
given an evaluation of the probability to encounter an obstruction in the route to reach the 
destination. 
This information are useful in order to identify those parts of the road network where more 
resources should be employed both to program retrofitting work on structures and for a 
more in-depth analysis of the system. 
 
6. References 
Buckle I.G., Kim S.H., A vulnerability assesment for highway bridge. ASCE. Lifeline 
Earthquake Engineering, 1995. 
Cafiso S., Condorelli A., Cutrona G., Mussumeci G. A Seismic Network Reliability 
Evaluation on GIS Environment - A Case Study on Catania Province. Risk Analysis 
IV, 2004, pagg. 131-140 - WIT Press, – ISBN 1-85312-736-1. 
www.intechopen.com
Modelling, Simulation and Identiication314
 
Cafiso S., Condorelli A., D’Andrea A.. Methodological Considerations for the Evaluation of 
Seismic Risk on Road Network.  Pure and Applied Geophysics, Vol. 162, n. 4, 2005. 
pagg.767-782. 
Cafiso S., La Bruna A., La Cava G. “Seismic Risk Assessment of Rural Road Network”. Risk 
Analysis, Simulation and Hazard Mitigation V. pp.91-100. WITpress, Southampton, 
United Kingdom, 2008. ISBN: 978-1-84564-104-7. 
Cafiso S. “Seismic Risk and Reliability for Rural Road Network”. IASTED International 
Conference on Modelling, Simulation and Identification, 2009, Pechino, Cina. 
Du Z.P., Nicholson A.J., Degradable Transportation System: Sensitivity and Reliability 
Analysis, Transportation Research B, 31(3), 225-237, 1997. 
Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia (I.N.G.V.). Mappa di pericolosità sismica del 
territorio nazionale PCM n. 3519, All. 1b. April 2006 in 
http://zonesismiche.mi.ingv.it/ 
Ord.P.C.M. n. 2788 del 12/06/1998, Individuazione delle zone ad elevato rischio sismico del 
territorio nazionale, 1998. 
NCHRP REPORT 525 - Costing Asset Protection: An All Hazards Guide for Transportation 
Agencies (CAPTA), Vol. 15, ISBN 978-0-309-11763-0, TRB 2009 
Selçuk A.S., Yücemen M.S., Reliability of lifeline networks under seismic hazard. Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, pp. 213-227, 1999 
Wakabayashi H., Idia Y., Upper and Lower bounds of terminal reliability of road networks: 
an efficient method with Boolean Algebra. Journal of Natural Disaster Science 14, 
pp. 29-44, 1992. 
www.intechopen.com
Modelling, Simulation and Identification
Edited by Azah Mohamed
ISBN 978-953-307-136-7
Hard cover, 354 pages
Publisher Sciyo
Published online 18, August, 2010
Published in print edition August, 2010
InTech Europe
University Campus STeP Ri 
Slavka Krautzeka 83/A 
51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
Phone: +385 (51) 770 447 
Fax: +385 (51) 686 166
www.intechopen.com
InTech China
Unit 405, Office Block, Hotel Equatorial Shanghai 
No.65, Yan An Road (West), Shanghai, 200040, China 
Phone: +86-21-62489820 
Fax: +86-21-62489821
Modeling, simulation and identification has been actively researched in solving practical engineering problems.
This book presents the wide applications of modeling, simulation and identification in the fields of electrical
engineering, mechanical engineering, civil engineering, computer science and information technology. The
book consists of 17 chapters arranged in an order reflecting multidimensionality of applications related to
power system, wireless communication, image and video processing, control systems, robotics, soil
mechanics, road engineering, mechanical structures and workforce capacity planning. New techniques in
signal processing, adaptive control, non-linear system identification, multi-agent simulation, eigenvalue
analysis, risk assessment, modeling of dynamic systems, finite difference time domain modeling and visual
feedback are also presented. We hope that readers will find the book useful and inspiring by examining the
recent developments in the applications of modeling, simulation and identification.
How to reference
In order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Salvatore Cafiso (2010). Assessment of Seismic Risk and Reliability of Road Network, Modelling, Simulation
and Identification, Azah Mohamed (Ed.), ISBN: 978-953-307-136-7, InTech, Available from:
http://www.intechopen.com/books/modelling--simulation-and-identification/seismic-risk-assessment-of-road-
network
© 2010 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
ShareAlike-3.0 License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction for
non-commercial purposes, provided the original is properly cited and
derivative works building on this content are distributed under the same
license.
